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The author defends the ancient claim that justice is at bottom a body of social conventions. Recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences together with insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy are integrated into a new game-theoretic conventionalist analysis of justice.
List of contents
- Chapter 1. Dilemmas of Interaction
- Chapter 2. Coordination, Conflict and Convention
- Chapter 3. The Circumstances of Justice
- Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Anarchy
- Chapter 5. Playing Fair
- Chapter 6. A Limited Leviathan
- Chapter 7. The Foole, the Shepherd and the Knave
- Chapter 8. Justice as Mutual Advantage?
- Appendix 1. Formal Definition of Convention
- Appendix 2. Computer Simulations of Inductive Learning in Games
- Appendix 3. Folk Theorems for the Indefinitely Repeated Covenant Game
- Appendix 4. Humean Conventions of the Repeated Sovereignty and Repeated Provider-Recipient Gamed
- References
- Index
About the author
Peter P. Vanderschraaf is Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science at the University of Arizona. He works in social philosophy and game theory. He has held visiting appointments at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Boston University, and the School of Social Sciences of the Institute for Advanced Study.
Summary
The author defends the ancient claim that justice is at bottom a body of social conventions. Recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences together with insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy are integrated into a new game-theoretic conventionalist analysis of justice.
