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Why did Britain go to war in Iraq in 2003? Existing accounts stress dodgy dossiers, intelligence failures, and the flaws of individual leaders. Deploying the large number of primary documents now available, this book puts ideas at the centre of the story. As the book argues, Britain's war in Iraq was caused by bad ideas that were dogmatically held and widely accepted. Three ideas in particular formed the war's intellectual foundations: the notion of the undeterrable, fanatical rogue state; the vision that the West's path to security is to break and remake states; and the conceit that by paying the 'blood price', Britain could secure influence in Washington DC. These issues matter, because although the Iraq War happened fifteen years ago, it is still with us. As well as its severe consequences for regional and international security, the ideas that powered the war persist in Western security debate. If all wars are fought twice, first on the battlefield and the second time in memory, this book enters the battle over what Iraq means now, and what we should learn.
List of contents
- Introduction
- 1: Warpath
- 2: Breaking States
- 3: Atlantic Ambitions
- 4: Weighing the Arguments
- 5: A Liberal War After All
- 6: Virtue Runs Amok: How Realism Can Help
- Epilogue: Two Speeches
About the author
Patrick Porter is Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His main research interests are U.S. and British grand strategy, the interaction of power and ideas in international relations, and diplomatic and military history. He has published in International Security, War in History and The Journal of Strategic Studies. He grew up in Melbourne, Australia, before completing his doctorate at the University of Oxford. He enjoys ancient history, cricket and cigars.
Summary
This book is the first in-depth history of Britain's decision to invade Iraq since the Chilcot Inquiry released its report. The volume controversially argues that it was a blunder, or a careless failure of judgement.
Foreword
Shortlisted for the British Army Military Book of the Year, 2019
Additional text
Blunder offers by far the best account of the most complex and contentious strategic decisions of our time, providing a vital textbook for future decision makers. It is deeply researched, theoretically nuanced, morally engaged, and scrupulously fair. A model of how scholarship can contribute vitally to urgent contemporary questions.
Report
Blunder is an important book and a must-read for those looking for a meticulous and fair-minded account of the most controversial strategic decision of the post-9/11 period. Michael McInerney, H-War, H-Net Reviews
