Read more
Zusatztext This is a timely book! interpreting climate change negotiations in terms of game theory concepts. The content of the book is based on a stream of papers published by the author over more than 20 years. The book is aimed at economists who use finely crafted mathematical models to explore possible solutions to complex social and environmental problems. The extensive bibliography will be helpful to any newcomer in the field of environmental economics. Informationen zum Autor Parkash Chander is professor of economics and executive director of the Center for Environmental Economics and Climate Change at the Jindal School of Government and Public Policy! O. P. Jindal Global University. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and was formerly head of the Indian Statistical Institute! Delhi! and of the Department of Economics at the National University of Singapore. Klappentext Parkash Chander argues that we can make progress on the climate-change impasse through incorporating the insights of game theory. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates. Zusammenfassung Despite the growing consensus on the need for action to counteract climate change, complex economic and political forces have so far prevented international actors from making much headway toward resolving the problem. Most approaches to climate change are based in economics and environmental science; in this book, Parkash Chander argues that we can make further progress on the climate change impasse by considering a third approach—game theory. Chander shows that a game-theoretic approach, which offers insight into the nature of interactions between sovereign countries behaving strategically and the kinds of outcomes such interactions produce, can illuminate how best to achieve international agreements in support of climate-change mitigation strategies. Game Theory and Climate Change develops a conceptual framework with which to analyze climate change as a strategic or dynamic game, bringing together cooperative and noncooperative game theory and providing practical analyses of international negotiations. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and argues that the Paris Agreement may succeed where the Kyoto Protocol failed. Finally, Chander discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates, including a global agreement to support development of cleaner technologies on a global scale. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface 1. Purpose and Scope 2. The Basic Framework 3. Rationale for Cooperation 4. The Core of a Strategic Game 5. Environmental Games 6. Coalition Formation Games 7. Dynamic Environmental Games 8. Limits to Climate Change 9. The Journey from Kyoto to Paris 10. International Trade and Climate Change Conclusion References Author Index Subject Index ...
