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Everyone allows that we can reason to a new belief from beliefs that we already have. Aristotle thought that we could also reason from beliefs to action. Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning establishes this possibility of reasoning to action, in a way that allows also for reasoning to intention, hope, fear, and doubt. While many philosophers have found little sense in Aristotle's claim, Dancy offers a general theory of reasoning that is sensitive to current debates but still Aristotelian in spirit. The text clearly sets out the similarities between reasoning to action and reasoning to belief, which are far more striking than any dissimilarities. Its detailed account of practical reasoning, a topic inadequately covered in current literature, is presented in such a way as to be intelligible to a variety of readers, making it an ideal resource for students of philosophy but also of interest to academics in related disciplines.
List of contents
- Introduction
- 1: What Is the (Supposed) Problem about Practical Reasoning?
- 2: How Practical Reasoning is Possible
- 3: The Material Theory of Practical Reasoning
- 4: From the Practical to the Theoretical
- 5: Moral Reasoning
- 6: Taking Stock
- 7: Instrumental Reasoning
- 8: Reasoning to Normative Belief
- 9: Reasoning to Intention
- 10: Loose Ends
About the author
Jonathan Dancy has worked at the University of Texas at Austin since 2005. He previously taught at the University of Keele for 25 years and then at the University of Reading before retiring in the UK in 2011.
Summary
Jonathan Dancy aims to establish the possibility of reasoning to action, by showing how similar it is to reasoning to belief. He offers a general theory of reasoning, which smoothly admits the differences there may be between the two types, while also considering the possibility of reasoning to hope, to fear, to doubt, and to intention.
Additional text
Recommended.
Report
...Practical Shape is as stimulating a book of philosophy as one could hope for. It will be an invaluable resource to those interested in the nature of reasoning, both practical and theoretical, for years to come. Laura Tomlinson, Journal of Moral Philosophy
