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One of Fichte's most important ideas - that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies - has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This volume aims to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte's theory of rational agency, Kosch examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte's conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte's account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a new interpretation of Fichte's conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte's first-order claims in normative ethics and political philosophy.
List of contents
- 1: Introduction
- 2: Rational Agency
- 3: Material independence
- 4: Formal independence
- 5: Independence as constitutive end
- 6: Conclusion
About the author
Michelle Kosch received a BA from Harvard College in 1990 and a PhD from Columbia University in 1999. She was employed as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center in Copenhagen, and thereafter as an assistant professor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan, before moving to Cornell in 2006.
Summary
One of Fichte's most important ideas - that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies - has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This volume aims to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte's theory of rational agency, Kosch examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte's conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte's account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a new interpretation of Fichte's conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte's first-order claims in normative ethics and political philosophy.
Additional text
Kosch's attention to Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right as she discusses the constitutive end of independence is especially welcome. The original work found in this final chapter contributes to what amounts to a powerful yet accessible presentation of Fichte's moral philosophy, one that is sure to generate scholarly discussion and encourage further original applications of his thought to contemporary philosophy.
Report
provocative, tightly-argued, and insightful book . . . Fichte's Ethics is highly recommended Gabriel Gottlieb, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
