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Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher's ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism.
List of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction.- Chapter 2: On the "Common Conception" of Truth.- Chapter 3: A Defence of Descriptive Metaphysics.- Chapter 4: An Ecological Approach in Experimental Philosophy.- Chapter 5: Commonsense Pluralism about Truth (Endoxic Alethic Pluralism). Chapter 6: Challenging Endoxic Alethic Pluralism.
About the author
Joseph Ulatowski is Lecturer in the Philosophy Programme and Director of the Experimental Philosophy Research Group at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. He has recently co-edited a volume with Cory D. Wright on Paul Horwich’s truth minimalism, and he has published work in the nature of truth, the nature of self, and philosophy of action.
Summary
Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher’s ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism.
