Read more
This study examines the CIA's "third force" strategy-providing support for a third-party alternative over two primary on-the-ground options-in East Asia during the first decade of the Cold War. The author argues that the strategy failed due to a lack of understanding of the historical and cultural contexts of the region.
List of contents
Introduction: The CIA and the Chinese Third Force during the Early 1950s
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1: The Collapse of the Anticommunist Resistance in China and the CIA's Launch of a Third Force, 1949-1950
Chapter 2: Quest for a Third Force during the Korean War, 1950-1953
Chapter 3: The Creation of a Third Force Committee in Hong Kong, 1950-1952
Chapter 4: The Political Wing of the Third Force: The Fighting League for Chinese Freedom and Democracy
Chapter 5: The Creation of a Third Force "Army" in Japan, Okinawa, and Saipan
Chapter 6: CIA Debacle: The Downey-Fecteau Third Force Mission to Manchuria
Chapter 7: Chinese Nationalist and Communist Reactions to the Third Force
Chapter 8: The Demise of the Third Forces, 1953-1954
Conclusion: Why Did the CIA's Chinese Third Force Project Fail?
Epilogue: "The Great American Dream": The CIA and the Vietnamese Third Force in the Early 1950s
About the author
Roger B. Jeans is Elizabeth Lewis Otey Professor of History emeritus at Washington and Lee University.
Summary
This study examines the CIA's "third force" strategy—providing support for a third-party alternative over two primary on-the-ground options—in East Asia during the first decade of the Cold War. The author argues that the strategy failed due to a lack of understanding of the historical and cultural contexts of the region.
