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Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethics.
List of contents
- Part I: Introduction
- 1: What is Assertion? In defense of the norm-based account
- Part II: The Epistemic Significance of Assertion
- 2: Assertion and the spread of knowledge
- 3: Assertion and Testimony
- Part III: Other Applications: Mind, Language, and More
- 4: Assertion and the Method of Interpretation (Radical and Otherwise)
- 5: Assertion and Assertoric Content
- 6: Assertion and Belief
- 7: The Ethics of Assertion (and Belief)
- 8: Anonymous Assertion
- Part IV: A case for context-sensitivity in the Norm of Assertion
- 9: Assertion and Disagreement
- 10: Mutuality and Assertion
- 11: The Costs of Context-Sensitivity
About the author
Sanford C. Goldberg is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University. He works on topics at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. He is author of Anti-Individualism (CUP, 2007), Relying on Others (OUP, 2010), and numerous other articles on such topics as disagreement, testimony, reliabilism, metaepistemology, the semantics of speech reports, reference, self-knowledge, and attitude externalism.
Summary
Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethics.
Additional text
This is an outstanding contribution to the growing literature on the speech act . . . Goldberg's work will surely be read for decades in both epistemology and the philosophy of language. With Assertion Goldberg only cements this legacy, presenting us with views that deserve to be the starting point of future investigations. Goldberg is an exceptionally clear writer, beginning each section with both a summary of the previous material and an explanation of its place in the book's larger scheme. It is this sort of clarity which makes it nearly impossible to get lost in the work even when it is at its most technical. This should be essential reading for those working in either the philosophy of language or epistemology. Philosophers of mind and psychology stand to learn much from it too.
