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Informationen zum Autor Clifford J. Carrubba is a Professor of Political Science, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Professor of Law, by courtesy, at Emory University, Atlanta. He also founded and is currently serving as the Director of the Institute for Quantitative Theory and Methods at Emory University. Carrubba has published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organizations, Political Analysis, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Matthew J. Gabel is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Washington University, St Louis, where he also serves as the associate chair of the department. In 2010, he was a John Simon Guggenheim Foundation Fellow. He is the author of Interests and Integration (1998) and has written articles for American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Common Market Studies, and Comparative Political Studies. Gabel is a founding associate editor of European Union Politics. Klappentext A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages. Zusammenfassung This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes member states are free to ignore international agreements and adverse court rulings! and that the court does not have any informational advantages. It demonstrates that international courts can facilitate cooperation with international law! but only within important political constraints. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction: international courts and compliance; 2. A theory of courts and compliance in international law; 3. The empirical relevance of the theoretical model: evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union context; 4. Preliminary considerations on testing the political-sensitivity hypothesis: designing a control for the legal merits; 5. A test of the political-sensitivity hypothesis; 6. A test of the conditional-effectiveness hypothesis: the European Court of Justice and economic integration; 7. Conclusion....
