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This book explores questions such as: How do adversaries communicate? How do diplomatic encounters shape international orders and determine whether states go to war?
List of contents
1. Can adversaries communicate?; 2. How perceptions of intentions form; Part I. Theory: 3. The scope of demands; 4. Risking a breach; 5. Balancing allies and adversaries; 6. Diplomatic approaches; Part II. Empirical Analysis: 7. The fruit of 1912 diplomacy; 8. How Germany weighed British resolve in 1938-9; 9. Statistical analysis of diplomatic communication; 10. Creating international orders; Appendices: A. Proofs for chapters 3-6; B. Inference data set; C. Threats, offers, and assurance dataset; D. German inferences prior to World War II.
About the author
Robert F. Trager is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has also taught at Yale University, Connecticut and the University of Oxford, held an Olin Fellowship at Harvard University, Massachusetts, and worked in investment banking in New York. His published work has appeared in such journals as the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organization, International Security, and Security Studies.
Summary
How do adversaries communicate? How do diplomatic encounters shape international orders and determine whether states go to war? Diplomacy, from alliance politics to nuclear brinkmanship, almost always operates through a few forms of signaling. Trager analyzes diplomatic network data, demonstrating the lasting effects on international affairs.
