Read more
Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons, but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons, but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship.
¿
Virtue's Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.
List of contents
Introduction: Virtue’s Reasons
Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun
Part I: Reasons, Character, and Agency
1. Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons
Garrett Cullity
2. Remote Scenarios and Warranted Virtue Attributions
Justin Oakley
3. Vice, Reason, and Wrongdoing
Damian Cox
4. Can Virtue Be Codified? An Inquiry on the Basis of Four Conceptions of Virtue
Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu
Part II: Reasons and Virtues in Development
5. Virtue, Reason, and Will
Ramon Das
6. Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue
Emer O’Hagan
7. Aretaic Role Modeling, Justificatory Reasons, and the Diversity of the Virtues
Robert Audi
Part III: Specific Virtues for Finite Rational Agents
8. Practical Wisdom: A Virtue for Resolving Conflicts among Practical Reasons
Andrés Luco
9. The Virtue of Modesty and the Egalitarian Ethos
S. Stewart Braun
10. Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons
Noell Birondo
About the author
Noell Birondo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wichita State University, USA. His primary interests lie at the intersection of contemporary ethical theory and ancient Greek philosophy. His articles have appeared in
The Monist, Ancient Philosophy, Ratio, the
Journal of Philosophical Research, the
Southwest Philosophy Review, and the
International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
S. Stewart Braun is Lecturer in the School of Philosophy and a member of the Institute of Religion and Critical Inquiry at Australian Catholic University. He specializes in social and political philosophy and also in normative and applied ethics. His articles have appeared in the
Journal of Applied Philosophy and
Law and Philosophy, among others.
Summary
Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons, but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons, but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship.
Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.
Additional text
"The chapters in this volume tend to be of a very high quality—and some are truly excellent, with the potential to shape future discussion in the area . . . Overall, this is a strong collection of insightful and often thought-provoking papers . . . Understood as a wide-ranging contribution to the leading-edge literature on virtue theory and character, the volume stands up very well." – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"This interesting collection is packed with creative and interesting papers that promise to open up new debates about the connections between virtue, reason, and moral development." – Bradford Cokelet, University of Miami
