Fr. 70.00

Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital

English · Hardback

Shipping usually within 3 to 5 weeks

Description

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This book proposes a solution to the 'too big to fail' problem that will help to prevent future financial crises.

List of contents










1. Introduction; 2. Mortgage public policies: 'cause' of the crisis; 3. Pre-crisis executive compensation and misaligned incentives; 4. Managerial incentives hypothesis versus the unforeseen risk hypothesis; 5. Bank CEOs' buys and sells during 2000-8; 6. Executive compensation reform; 7. Director compensation policy; 8. Are large banks riskier?; 9. Bank capital structure and executive compensation; 10. Why banks should be mostly debt financed: parade of non sequiturs; 11. Conclusion.

About the author

Sanjai Bhagat is Provost Professor of Finance at the University of Colorado Boulder. He has worked previously at the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Princeton University, New Jersey and the University of Chicago. He is a board member of ProLink Solutions, an enterprise software company; Integra Ventures, a venture capital company; and the National Association of Corporate Directors, Colorado Chapter. He has advised US government agencies and Fortune 500 companies on corporate governance and finance issues, and has submitted several amici curiae briefs on class action litigation to the US Supreme Court, which have been cited in the high court's decision.

Summary

This book proposes a solution to the 'too big to fail' problem that will help to prevent future financial crises through the restructuring of executive incentive programmes. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as students studying finance, economics and law.

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