Read more
This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate.
Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses.
Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal disagreements?
List of contents
Preface by Francesca Poggi.- Law and the Primacy of Pragmatics by Brian Butler.- Defeasibility and Pragmatic Indeterminacy in Law by Andrei Marmor.- Legal Pragmatics by Mario Jori.- The Semantics and Pragmatics of According to the Law by José Juan Moreso and Samuele Chilovi.- Deep Interpretive Disagreements and Theory of Legal Interpretation by Vittorio Villa.- Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference by Genoveva Martí and Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña.- The Rational Law-maker by Alessandro Capone.- The Pragmatics of Meaning and Morality in the Common Law: Parallels and Divergences by Ross Charnock.- What did you (legally) say? Cooperative and Strategic Interactions by Claudia Bianchi.- Widening the Gricean Picture to Strategic Exchanges by Lucia Morra.- Grice, the law, and the Linguistic Special Case Thesis by Francesca Poggi.- 12. Materialization in Legal Communication in the Transferring Process by Anne Wagner.
Summary
This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate.
Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses.
Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal disagreements?
