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Informationen zum Autor Daniel W. Gingerich is Assistant Professor of Politics specializing in comparative politics at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He received his PhD from Harvard University, Massachusetts and has held fellowships in Princeton University's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics and the Inter-American Development Bank's Visiting Scholar's Program. Professor Gingerich's research focuses on understanding the causes and consequences of corruption and clientelism in Latin America as well as developing new methodologies to study these phenomena. He has published various articles in journals such as Political Analysis, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. His scholarship has been funded by organizations such as the National Science Foundation. Klappentext This book examines how the structure of electoral institutions may affect political corruption. Zusammenfassung This book examines how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption! defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework; 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis; 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation; 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies; 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile; 6. Conclusion.
