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Zusatztext This book nicely brings together work that has had substantial impact on the way philosophers view the relative merits of functionalism and type-identity theory -- and should be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, both beginning and advanced. And if it raises questions that generate a "third wave" of debate and inquiry, then this is progress indeed. Informationen zum Autor Thomas Polger received his PhD in philosophy from Duke University in 2000, and joined the faculty of the University of Cincinnati in the same year. His previous book, Natural Minds, was a defense of the mind-brain identity theory. He is the author of numerous articles in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Polger is also a past-president of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology.Lawrence Shapiro received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania in 1992 and has been on the faculty at the University of Wisconsin since 1993. He has published numerous articles and several books on a range of topics within philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of cognitive science. Klappentext Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first full investigation of multiple realization--the idea that minds can be realized in ways other than the human brain. They cast doubt on the hypothesis and offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, and in chemistry, biology, and related fields. Zusammenfassung Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first full investigation of multiple realization--the idea that minds can be realized in ways other than the human brain. They cast doubt on the hypothesis and offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, and in chemistry, biology, and related fields. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface Acknowledgments Section I. Whence Multiple Realization? 1: Physicalism and Multiple Realization 2: Realization and Multiple Realization 3: What is Multiple Realization? 4: Multiple Realization and Relevant Differences Section II. The Evidence for Multiple Realization 5: Evidence for Multiple Realization: Neural Plasticity 6: Evidence for Multiple Realization: Kind Splitting and Comparative Evidence 7: The Likelihood of Multiple Realization 8: The Computationalist Argument for Multiple Realizability Section III. After Multiple Realization 9: Putnam's Revenge 10: Causal Exclusion and the Autonomy of Psychology Guide for Teaching and Learning References ...
