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Zusatztext The volume is an invaluable resource for understanding the link between moral philosophy and implicit bias--especially as it concerns moral responsibility. A review cannot do justice to the painstaking attention that nearly all the authors devote to empirical research in this area. Informationen zum Autor Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and visiting faculty at Deep Springs College. His published articles on automaticity, spontaneity, and implicit bias have appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These mark a small transition from his first publication, 'The Wonderful World of Tame Reptiles', in Reptile Hobbyist.Jennifer Saul is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. Her research is primarily in philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of race. She is the author of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (OUP, 2012); Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions (OUP, 2007); and Feminism: Issues and Arguments (OUP, 2003). She directed the Leverhulme International Network in Implicit Bias and Philosophy (2011-2013) that gave rise to these volumes. She has also served as a consultant on a zombie movie script. Klappentext Most people have implicit biases: they evaluate social groups in ways that they are unconscious of or cannot control, and which may run counter to their conscious beliefs and values. This volume explores the themes of moral responsibility in implicit bias, structural injustice in society, and strategies for implicit attitude change. Zusammenfassung Most people have implicit biases: they evaluate social groups in ways that they are unconscious of or cannot control, and which may run counter to their conscious beliefs and values. This volume explores the themes of moral responsibility in implicit bias, structural injustice in society, and strategies for implicit attitude change. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Section One: Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias 1.1: Natalia Washington and Daniel Kelly: Whose Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias 1.2: Joshua Glasgow: Alienation and Responsibility 1.3: Robin Zheng: Attributablity, Accountability, and Implicit Attitudes 1.4: Maureen Sie and Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours: Stereotypes and Prejudice: Whose Responsibility? Indirect Personal Responsibility for Implicit Bias 1.5: Luc Faucher: Revisionism and Moral Responsibility Section Two: Structural Injustice 2.1: Lawrence Blum: The Too Minimal Political, Moral, and Civil Dimension of Claude Steele's 'Stereotype Threat' Paradigm 2.2: Anne Jacobson: Reducing Bias: Attitudinal and Institutional Change Section Three: The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice 3.1: Clea F. Rees: A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias 3.2: Michael Brownstein: Implicit Bias, Context, and Character 3.3: Samantha Brennan: The Moral Status of Micro-Inequities: In Favour of Institutional Solutions 3.4: Katya Hosking and Roseanne Russell: Discrimination Law, Equity Law, and Implicit Bias ...
