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Zusatztext I hope to have shown just how relevant this book is for current discussions within social philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, and moral psychology. Given the strong reliance on empirical literature, for example, providing alternative interpretations of existent empirical studies (as in Carole Lee's contribution), presenting empirical results themselves (as in Laura Di Bella, Eleanor Miles, and Jennifer Saul's contribution), the chapters in this book are not only interesting to philosophers but also to empirical researchers. Another strength of this book is the variety of questions it covers, ranging from a new understanding of stereotype threat (Ron Mallon's chapter) to expanding on the epistemic consequences of this phenomenon (Stacey Goguen's chapter); from the proposal that implicit biases are not mental states (Edouard Machery's chapter) to a prescription on how to pursue the ethical ideal of being unprejudiced without incurring epistemic costs (Alex Madva's chapter). Informationen zum Autor Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and visiting faculty at Deep Springs College. His published articles on automaticity, spontaneity, and implicit bias have appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These mark a small transition from his first publication, 'The Wonderful World of Tame Reptiles', in Reptile Hobbyist.Jennifer Saul is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. Her research is primarily in philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of race. She is the author of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (OUP, 2012); Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions (OUP, 2007); and Feminism: Issues and Arguments (OUP, 2003). She directed the Leverhulme International Network in Implicit Bias and Philosophy (2011-2013) that gave rise to these volumes. She has also served as a consultant on a zombie movie script. Klappentext Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. This volume addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions about implicit bias, including its effect on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. Zusammenfassung Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. This volume addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions about implicit bias, including its effect on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Section One: The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat 1.1: Keith Frankish: Playing Double: Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-Control 1.2: Bryce Huebner: Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition 1.3: Jules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman: The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias 1.4: Edouard Machery: DeFreuding Implicit Attitudes 1.5: Ron Mallon: Stereotype Threat and Persons Section Two: Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality 2.1: Louise M. Antony: Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism 2.2: Alex Madva: Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias 2.3: Stacey Goguen: Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality 2.4: Catherine E. Hundleby: The Status Quo Fallacy: Implicit Bias and Fallacies of Argumentation 2.5: ...
