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Informationen zum Autor Mark Siderits' research interests lie in the intersection between classical Indian philosophy on the one hand, and analytic metaphysics and philosophy of language on the other. He received his PhD from Yale University, and taught first at Illinois State University and then at Seoul National University, retiring from the latter in 2012. Among his more recent publications are Buddhism As Philosophy (Ashgate/Hackett, 2007), Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons (Ashgate, 2nd revised edition 2015) and, together with Shôryû Katsura,Nâgârjuna's Middle Way: Mûlamadhyamakakârikâ (Wisdom, 2013). He has also edited several collections of work on Indian/analytic philosophy, including Self, No Self? (with Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi OUP, 2010).Jan Westerhoff is Associate Professor of Religious Ethics at the University of Oxford, a Fellow and Tutor in Theology and Religion at Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford, and a Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His publications include Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka (OUP, 2009), The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani (OUP, 2010), and Reality: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2011). His research concentrates on systematic aspects of ancient Indian Philosophy, especially on Madhyamaka. Klappentext This book brings together nineteen of Mark Siderits's most important essays on Buddhist philosophy. Together they cover a variety of topics, from metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and ethics, to the specific discussions of the interaction between Buddhist and classical Indian philosophy. Zusammenfassung This book brings together nineteen of Mark Siderits's most important essays on Buddhist philosophy. Together they cover a variety of topics, from metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and ethics, to the specific discussions of the interaction between Buddhist and classical Indian philosophy. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction 1: Madhyamaka and anti-realism 1.1: Nagarjuna as anti-realist 1.2: Thinking on empty: Madhyamaka anti-realism and canons of rationality 1.3: On the soteriological significance of emptiness 1.4: A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth 2: Logical and metaphysical problems 2.1: Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense 2.2: Do Persons Supervene on Skandhas? 2.3: Causation in Early Madhyamaka 2.4: Contradiction in Buddhist argumentation 2.5: Deductive, inductive, both, or neither? 3: Philosophy of language 3.1: Buddhist nominalism and desert 3.2: Apohavada, nominalism, and resemblance theories 3.3: The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language 4: Epistemology 4.1: The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology I 4.2: The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology II 4.3: Madhyamaka on Naturalized Epistemology 5: Ethics 5.1: Buddhist paleo-compatibilism 5.2: Buddhist reductionism and the structure of Buddhist ethics 6: Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian Philosophy 6.1: Nyaya realism, Buddhist critique 6.2: Distinguishing the Madhyamika from the Advaitin: a field guide Abbreviations Bibliography ...
