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Zusatztext "...articulates and defends a novel view of thick concepts extremely carefully and rigorously...makes considerable advances not only in the thick concepts debate but in metaethics and metanormative philosophy in general. " -Debbie Roberts, Ethics Informationen zum Autor Pekka Väyrynen is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Leeds Klappentext In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick concepts, Pekka Vayrynen argues that all this is mistaken. Through detailed attention to the language of thick concepts, he defends a novel theory on which the relationship between thick words and evaluation is best explained by general conversational and pragmatic norms. Drawing on general principles in philosophy of language, he argues that many prominent features of thick words and concepts can be explained by general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative. If evaluation is not essential to the sort of thinking we do with thick concepts, claims for the deep and distinctive significance of the thick are undermined. TheLewd, the Rude and the Nasty is a fresh and innovative treatment of an important topic in moral philosophy and sets a new agenda for future work. It will be essential reading to anyone interested in the analysis and the broader philosophical significance of evaluative and normative language. Zusammenfassung Väyrynen argues that thick concepts -- such as lewd and rude, selfish and cruel, courageous and kind -- are evaluative only as a matter of pragmatics. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning, they cannot have the deep and distinctive significance they are often given in moral philosophy. Inhaltsverzeichnis Contents 1 Why Thick Concepts Matter 1.1 A Brief Preview 1.2 The Intuitive Distinction 1.3 Two Questions about the Thick 1.4 Thick Matters 1.5 Looking Ahead 2 Thick Concepts, Meaning and Evaluation 2.1 What is Evaluation? 2.2 What is Meaning? 2.3 What Count as Thick Terms and Concepts? 2.4 Global vs. Embedded Evaluations 3 Against the Semantic View I: The Data 3.1 Methodology: A Quick Overview 3.2 Objectionable Thick Terms and Concepts 3.3 Evaluations and Projection 3.4 Evaluations and Deniability 3.5 Conclusion 4 Against the Semantic View II: Against Rival Explanations 4.1 Three False Starts 4.2 Unwanted Implicatures? 4.3 Empty Thick Concepts? 4.4 Inverted-Commas Uses of Thick Terms? 4.5 Deniability and Metalinguistic Negation 4.6 Conclusion 5 In Defense of the Pragmatic View 5.1 T-Evaluations and Implicature 5.2 T-Evaluations and Conventions of Use 5.3 T-Evaluations and Presupposition 5.4 T-Evaluations and Pragmatic Not-At-Issue Content 5.5 Conclusion 6 Thick Pragmatics 6.1 T-Evaluations and Parochiality 6.2 T-Evaluations and Communicative Interests 6.3 Three Objections 6.4 More on Parochiality 6.5 The Scope of the Pragmatic View 6.6 Conclusion 7 Thick Concepts and Underdetermination 7.1 Disagreement and Extension 7.2 Underdetermination and Evaluation 7.3 Underdetermination and Gradability 7.4 Explaining Underdetermination+ 7.5 Conclusion 8 Shapelessness, Disentanglement and Irreducible Thickness 8.1 The Shapelessness Thesis 8.2 Shapelessness and Outrunning 8.3 The Inseparability Thesis 8.4 Irreducibly Thick Evaluation? 8.5 Conclusion 9 Thick C...
