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Zusatztext The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area. Informationen zum Autor Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998 to 2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Säid Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of The Economics of E- Commerce (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world. Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Klappentext This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors. Zusammenfassung This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Part I: General Principles 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design? 2: Gary E. Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory Part II: Cases Section II.A: Matching Markets 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Ünver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved? 8: Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit Section II.B: Auctions 10: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods 11: Robert Day and Paul Milgrom: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions 12: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds Section II.C: E-Commerce 13: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior 14: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents 15: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith Section II.D: Law Design 18: Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences Part III: Experiments 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experim...
