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Zusatztext There is much of interest here for philosophers of language and law on the nuance of linguistic sources of vagueness and how to resolve them. Informationen zum Autor Hrafn Asgeirsson is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Law at the University of Surrey, School of Law.In this monograph, Hrafn Asgeirsson argues that vagueness in the law is sometimes a good thing, although its value should not be overestimated. Zusammenfassung Lawmaking is – paradigmatically – a type of speech act: people make law by saying things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined by what lawmakers communicate. However, what they communicate is sometimes vague and, even when it is clear, the content itself is sometimes vague.This monograph examines the nature and consequences of these two linguistic sources of indeterminacy in the law. The aim is to give plausible answers to three related questions: In virtue of what is the law vague? What might be good about vague law? How should courts resolve cases of vagueness? It argues that vagueness in the law is sometimes a good thing, although its value should not be overestimated.It also proposes a strategy for resolving borderline cases, arguing that textualism and intentionalism – two leading theories of legal interpretation – often complement rather than compete with each other. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Authority, Communication and Legal Content I. The Communicative-Content Theory of Law and Its (Recent) Critics II. The Pro Tanto View about Legal Content III. Authority, Communication and Legal Content 2. On the Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law I. Incommensurate Multidimensionality, Extravagant Vagueness and Endicott’s Argument from Instrumental Necessity II. Incommensurate Multidimensionality is Doing the Real Work III. The Impossibility of Specification IV. Are Incommensurate Multidimensionality and – Hence – Vagueness Really Necessary? V. Waldron’s Argument from Facilitation VI. Possible Reply: Vagueness Really is a Means to the Relevant Ends VII. Another Possible Reply: The Logic of Value Validates Closure under Necessary Consequence 3. Vagueness and Power Delegation in Law I. Sorensen’s View II. The Value of Vagueness III. Summary 4. Vagueness, Uncertainty and Behaviour I. Endicott’s Argument from Comparative Value II. Hadfield on the Value of Vagueness-related Uncertainty III. Sorensen on Vagueness-related Uncertainty and Legal Unpredictability 5. On the Possibility of Non-literal Legislative Speech I. The Conditions for Non-literal Speech and the Legislative Context II. Revising the Argument: Restrict, Reconstruct, or Both? III. Testing the Argument against Experience: Ekins’s Argument from Examples IV. Indeterminacy about Utterance Content 6. Textualism, Content and Interpretation I. Textualism and Legislative Intentions II. Textualism, Communicative Content and Legal Content III. Textualism/Originalism and Contextual Enrichment IV. On the Plausibility of Conception Textualism V. Contemporary Textualism and the Problem of Legislative Context VI. Textualism and Legal Interpretation 7. Resolving Cases of Vagueness I. Expressly Offered Rationale and the Notion of Commitment II. Institutional Remedies to Non-co-operation III. Is Expression Required? IV. Commitment and Counterfactuals V. Legislative Rationale and Levels of AbstractionVI. Authority, Legislative Bargaining and Maximising Fidelity to Law VII. Expressly Acknowledged Compromise vs Tacitly Acknowledged Compromise VIII. Conclusion 8. Legal Practice and Theories of Vagueness I. Explaining the Value of Vagueness in the Law II. A Closer Look at Soames’s Argument III. Generalising the Argument: Other Cautionary Tales...
