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Informationen zum Autor Dr. R.B. Watts is a retired Coast Guard captain who has written extensively on sea power and contingencies in USNI Proceedings, the Naval War College Review and other professional journals and most recently served as the Coast Guard Chief of Contingency Planning and Exercises before retiring to take a professorship at the National War College, where he teaches courses in war and statecraft, domestic policy, homeland security, military history, and irregular warfare. He lives in Washington D.C. Klappentext Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has sought to achieve Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of "command of the sea" using large battle fleets of capital ships. This strategy has been generally successful: no force can oppose the U.S. Navy on the open seas. Yet capital ship theory has become increasingly irrelevant. Globally, irregular warfare dominates the spectrum of conflict, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Fleet engagements are a thing of the past and even small scale missions that rely on capital ships are challenged by irregular warfare. In a pattern evident since World War II, the U.S. Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts--with mixed results--before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century, and the need for U.S. naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm. Zusammenfassung In a pattern evident since World War II! the US Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts - with mixed results - before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century! and the need for US naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm. Inhaltsverzeichnis Table of ContentsAcknowledgmentsPrefaceIntroductionOne. The Changing Paradigm of War: The United States and Irregular Warfare TheoryTwo. The Philosophy: A.T. Mahan and the Foundations of U.S. Naval ThoughtThree. War Fighting Theory and Practice, 1914-1941: The Ascendancy of the Capital ShipFour. Lessons, Retrenchment, and Theory, 1945-1951Five. Theory and the Challenge of Irregular Warfare, 1950-1980Six. Theoretical Renaissance: The Maritime Strategy, 1980-1990Seven. Strategy Adrift, 1990-2001Eight. The New Challenge: 9/11 and the Use of Naval Power in Irregular WarfareNine. The Legacy Lives OnConclusions-The Cycles of HistoryChapter NotesBibliographyIndex...
