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Zusatztext A sustained defense of the necessary aboutness of language and of cognitive states! based on an account of modality according to which the space of possibilities is determined by the natures of existing particular things. Simchen revisits arguments about! among other topics! actualism! essentialism! rigidity! the de re/de dicto distinction! and the distinction between narrow and wide content shedding new light on old themes. This book should be of interest to anyoneworking on reference! modality or cognition. Informationen zum Autor Ori Simchen received his PhD in 1999 from Harvard University and is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. Klappentext Is it possible for the name of a particular person not to refer to that person? Ori Simchen defends a negative answer to this question, and presents a new account of aboutness, or intentionality. He argues that intentional items--such as words, thoughts, photos--are about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, rather than contingency. Zusammenfassung Some things in the world—intentional items such as words, thoughts, portraits, and passport photos—are about things, whereas other things in the world—sticks, stones, and fireflies—are not about anything. Necessary Intentionality is a study of aboutness, or intentionality, with a focus on the following question: are intentional items typically about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, or is their aboutness, rather, a matter of merecontingency? Consider, for example, a particular name referring to a particular person, or a specific belief with respect to some particular thing that it is such and so. Is it possible for the name not to have referred to the person and for the belief not to have been about the thing? Ori Simchen defends a negativeanswer to such questions. That the name refers to the person is necessary for the name and that the belief is about the thing is necessary for the belief. Simchen articulates his overall position in two main stages. In the first stage he fleshes out a requisite modal metaphysical background. In the second stage he brings the modal metaphysics to bear on cognition, specifically the aboutness of cognitive states and episodes. Simchen presents a productivist approach, which takes aboutness to bedetermined by the conditions of production of intentional items, rather than an interpretivist approach that takes aboutness to be determined by conditions of consumption of such items. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction; Modality; 1 Particular Possibilities; 2 General Possibilities; Intentionality; 3 The Intentionality of Words; Appendix I: Necessity in Reference; 4 Epistemology Factualized; 5 Cognitive States as Relational; Appendix II: Omniscient Believing and Consistency; Bibliography; Index...
Summary
Is it possible for the name of a particular person not to refer to that person? Ori Simchen defends a negative answer to this question, and presents a new account of aboutness, or intentionality. He argues that intentional items--such as words, thoughts, photos--are about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, rather than contingency.
