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Zusatztext The rich, comprehensive view Pettit develops in this volume will more than repay engagement by philosophers working in normative ethics, and metaethics, and the theory of action. Informationen zum Autor Philip Pettit is L.S.Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values, Princeton University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University. Among his books are The Common Mind (1993), Republicanism (1997), Rules, Reasons and Norms (2002), Made with Words (2008), On the Peoples Terms (2012) and Just Freedom (2014). He has co-authored The Economy of Esteem (2004, with Geoffrey Brennan), A Political Philosophy in Public Life (2010, with Jose Marti) and Group Agency (2011 with Christian List). Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit appeared with OUP in 2007. Klappentext Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues. Zusammenfassung Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preview 1: The Robust Demands of Attachment 2: The Robust Demands of Virtue 3: The Robust Demands of Respect 4: The Rationale of Robust Demands 5: Doing Good and Being Good 6: Doing Good and Doing Evil 7: Doing Good and Doing Right Overview Appendix I. Reconstructing attachment, virtue and respect Appendix II. Robustness and Probability Appendix III. Robust robustness References Index ...
