Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein examines the implications of moral hazard for health care in the context of contemporary American health care policy. She presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this.

List of contents

Foreword, by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Introduction, by Joseph P. Newhouse
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Developments Since Arrow (1963), by Amy Finkelstein
Commentary, by Jonathan Gruber
Commentary, by Kenneth J. Arrow
Commentary, by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Discussion
Arrow (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, by Kenneth J. Arrow
Notes on Contributors
Index

About the author

Amy Finkelstein. With Kenneth J. Arrow, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph P. Newhouse, and Joseph E. Stiglitz

Summary

Amy Finkelstein examines the implications of moral hazard for health care in the context of contemporary American health care policy. She presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this.

Product details

• Authors: Amy Finkelstein, Finkelstein Amy
• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 02.12.2014
• EAN: 9780231163804
• ISBN: 978-0-231-16380-4
• No. of pages: 160
• Assisted by: Kenneth Arrow, Joseph Newhouse
• Series: Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series; Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series; Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture
• Subjects: Natural sciences, medicine, IT, technology > Medicine > General; Social sciences, law, business > Business > General, dictionaries; USA, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Insurance / Health, United States of America, USA, Medical insurance, public health; economics; health insurance