Fr. 71.50

Knowing Right From Wrong

English · Paperback / Softback

Shipping usually within 1 to 3 weeks (not available at short notice)

Description

Read more










Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.

List of contents










  • Contents

  • Preface

  • Introduction

  • 1: Disagreement

  • 2: Reliability

  • 3: Knowledge

  • 4: Human Nature

  • Bibliography

  • Index



About the author

Kieran Setiya is Professor of Philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He works in action theory, epistemology, and ethics, and is the author of Reasons without Rationalism (Princeton University Press, 2007).

Summary

Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.

Additional text

rich and provocative

Product details

Authors Kieran Setiya, Kieran (University of Pittsburgh) Setiya
Publisher Oxford University Press
 
Languages English
Product format Paperback / Softback
Released 20.11.2014
 
EAN 9780198709619
ISBN 978-0-19-870961-9
No. of pages 184
Subjects Education and learning > Adult education/adult education classes > Self-tuition materials (general)
Humanities, art, music > Philosophy > General, dictionaries
Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works

Customer reviews

No reviews have been written for this item yet. Write the first review and be helpful to other users when they decide on a purchase.

Write a review

Thumbs up or thumbs down? Write your own review.

For messages to CeDe.ch please use the contact form.

The input fields marked * are obligatory

By submitting this form you agree to our data privacy statement.