Fr. 56.90

Philosophy Without Intuitions

English · Paperback / Softback

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Description

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The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.

List of contents










  • Preface and Acknowledgements

  • 1: Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy

  • Part I: The Argument from 'Intuition'-Talk

  • Introduction to Part I

  • 2: 'Intuitive', 'Intuitively', 'Intuition', and 'Seem' in English

  • 3: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (I): A Defective Practice and the Verbal Virus Theory

  • 4: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (II): Some Strategies for Charitable Interpretation

  • Appendix to Chapter 4: Williamson on Intuition as Belief and Inclination to Believe

  • 5: Philosophers' Use of 'Intuitive' (III): Against the Explaining Away of Intuitions

  • Part II: The Argument from Philosophical Practice

  • Introduction to Part II

  • 6: Centrality and Philosophical Practice

  • 7: Diagnostics for Intuitiveness

  • 8: Case Studies

  • 9: Lessons Learned, Replies to Objections, and Comparison to Williamson

  • 10: Conceptual Analysis and Intuitions

  • 11: A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy

  • Bibliography

  • Index



About the author

Herman Cappelen is a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews, where he works at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of many papers and three books: Insensitive Semantics (with Ernest Lepore), Language Turned on Itself (with Ernest Lepore), and Relativism and Monadic Truth (with John Hawthorne).

Summary

The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.

Additional text

an excellent contribution to the ongoing debate

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