Read more
Jakob Hohwy explores a new theory in neuroscience: the idea that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about sensory input. He explains the rich and multifaceted character of our conscious perception, and argues that the mind has a fragile, indirect relation to the world.
About the author
Jakob Hohwy is a philosopher engaged in both conceptual and experimental research. He works on problems in philosophy of mind about perception, neuroscience, and mental illness. At the same time, he collaborates with neuroscientists and psychiatrists, conducting experiments that put philosophical ideas to the test and that bring philosophical concerns into the lab. Hohwy completed his PhD at the Australian National University, his Masters degree at St Andrews University in Scotland, and his basic philosophy training in Denmark. He has set up the Philosophy and Cognition lab in the Philosophy Department at Monash University in Melbourne.
Summary
Jakob Hohwy explores a new theory in neuroscience: the idea that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about sensory input. He explains the rich and multifaceted character of our conscious perception, and argues that the mind has a fragile, indirect relation to the world.
Additional text
Every now and then a book appears that looks set to be a milestone in the interdisciplinary study of mind. This is one of those rare and important books. The core organizing principle of mentality itself, Hohwy persuasively argues, is the prediction of our own ongoing streams of sensory input. Hohwy applies this principle to cases ranging from simple sensing all the way to hallucinations, delusions, consciousness, emotion, the sense of presence, and the nature of the self. A wonderful, timely, ground-breaking treatment, and required reading for anyone interested in the nature and possibility of mind.
