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Zusatztext Gibbard's book represents the most ambitious and innovative attempt to explain meaning since Paul Horwich and Robert Brandom developed their theories in the nineties. The first half offers richly detailed accounts of word meaning, analyticity, synonymy, reference, truth, and truth conditions, and the second half focuses on normative expressions, updating and extending Gibbard's celebrated expressivist account of the meanings of those terms, and integrating the account with the general theory of meaning that is developed in earlier chapters . . . I hope that this splendid book will find a wide audience. It is wonderfully stimulating, opening up vast new territories for investigation. Informationen zum Autor Allan Gibbard is Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. He is the author of Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics (OUP, 2008), Thinking How to Life (Harvard, 2003), and Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Harvard/OUP, 1990). Klappentext The concepts of meaning and mental content resist naturalistic analysis. This is because they are normative: they depend on ideas of how things ought to be. Allan Gibbard offers an expressivist explanation of these 'oughts': he borrows devices from metaethics to illuminate deep problems at the heart of the philosophy of language and thought. Gibbard's book represents the most ambitious and innovative attempt to explain meaning since Paul Horwich and Robert Brandom developed their theories in the nineties. The first half offers richly detailed accounts of word meaning, analyticity, synonymy, reference, truth, and truth conditions, and the second half focuses on normative expressions, updating and extending Gibbard's celebrated expressivist account of the meanings of those terms, and integrating the account with the general theory of meaning that is developed in earlier chapters ... I hope that this splendid book will find a wide audience. It is wonderfully stimulating, opening up vast new territories for investigation. Christopher S. Hill, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Zusammenfassung The concepts of meaning and mental content resist naturalistic analysis. This is because they are normative: they depend on ideas of how things ought to be. Allan Gibbard offers an expressivist explanation of these 'oughts': he borrows devices from metaethics to illuminate deep problems at the heart of the philosophy of language and thought. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1: Introduction 2: Normativity and Community 3: Kripke's Wittgenstein on Meaning 4: Correct Belief 5: Horwich on Meaning 6: The Normative Meaning Role 7: Reference, Truth, and Context 8: Meaning and Plans 9: Interpreting Interpretation 10: Expressivism, Non-Naturalism, and Us Appendix 1: The Objects of Belief Appendix 2: Schroeder on Expressivism References Index ...
