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Zusatztext [an] excellent book Informationen zum Autor Jessica Moss studied for her PhD in philosophy at Princeton University and taught at the University of Pittsburgh, before coming to Oxford as a tutorial fellow in Ancient Philosophy at Balliol College. She specializes in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, with a particular focus on the relation between their ethical and psychological views. Her articles have appeared in publications such as Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Phronesis, and The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic. Klappentext Jessica Moss presents a bold and controversial account of Aristotle's moral psychology. She argues that on Aristotle's view things appear good to us in virtue of a psychological capacity responsible for quasi-perceptual phenomena: phantasia ('imagination'). Her interpretation restricts the role of reason in ethics, and prioritises pleasure instead. [an] excellent book Stephen Makin, Times Literary Supplement Zusammenfassung Jessica Moss presents a bold and controversial account of Aristotle's moral psychology. She argues that on Aristotle's view things appear good to us in virtue of a psychological capacity responsible for quasi-perceptual phenomena: phantasia ('imagination'). Her interpretation restricts the role of reason in ethics, and prioritises pleasure instead. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction PART I: THE APPARENT GOOD 1: Evaluative cognition 2: Perceiving the good 3: Phantasia and the Apparent Good PART II: THE APPARENT GOOD AND NON-RATIONAL MOTIVATION 4: Passions and the Apparent Good 5: Akrasia and the Apparent Good PART III: THE APPARENT GOOD AND RATIONAL MOTIVATION 6: Phantasia and Deliberation 7: Happiness, Virtue, and the Apparent Good 8: Practical Induction Conclusion: Aristotle's Practical Empiricism Bibliography Index
