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Zusatztext A sustained defense of the necessary aboutness of language and of cognitive states, based on an account of modality according to which the space of possibilities is determined by the natures of existing particular things. Simchen revisits arguments about, among other topics, actualism, essentialism, rigidity, the de re/de dicto distinction, and the distinction between narrow and wide content shedding new light on old themes. This book should be of interest to anyone working on reference, modality or cognition. Informationen zum Autor Ori Simchen received his PhD in 1999 from Harvard University and is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Colombia. Klappentext Is it possible for the name of a particular person not to refer to that person? Ori Simchen defends a negative answer to this question, and presents a new account of aboutness, or intentionality. He argues that intentional items--such as words, thoughts, photos--are about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, rather than contingency. Zusammenfassung Is it possible for the name of a particular person not to refer to that person? Ori Simchen defends a negative answer to this question, and presents a new account of aboutness, or intentionality. He argues that intentional items--such as words, thoughts, photos--are about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, rather than contingency. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Modality 1: Particular Possibilities 2: General Possibilities Intentionality 3: The Intentionality of Words Appendix I: Necessity in Reference 4: Epistemology Factualized 5: Cognitive States as Relational Appendix II: Omniscient Believing and Consistency Bibliography Index
