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Zusatztext This really is an impressive book. It provides the most rigorous argument that I have seen so far for the attractive and increasingly popular suggestion that, by developing the idea of an interpersonal point of view, we get better accounts of both the content and the authority of morality than anything the consequentialists can offer. Informationen zum Autor Paul Hurley is Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, California. Klappentext Paul Hurley sets out a radical challenge to consequentialism, the theory which might seem to be the default option in contemporary moral philosophy. There is an unresolved tension within the theory: if consequentialists are right about the content of morality, then morality cannot have the rational authority that even they take it to have. Zusammenfassung Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he undermines consequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinct conception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1: Introduction 2: The Challenge to Consequentialism: A Troubling Normative Triad 3: The Demandingness Objection: Too Demanding, Or Not Demanding at All? 4: Harnessing Williams to Sharpen the Challenge to Consequentialism 5: Deflating the Challenge ^iof Consequentialism 6: From Impersonality to Interpersonality: Alternative Conceptions of Impartiality 7: Impartial Evaluation and Rational Authority 8: Generalizing to Other Forms of Consequentialism Bibliography ...
