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Zusatztext This comprehensive volume studies the development and consequences of corporate governance mechanisms in modern economies. It will be of great value to economists! lawyers! policy makers! and all who are concerned with economic development and the distribution of power within modern societies. Informationen zum Autor Joseph A. McCahery is Professor of International Business Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law and the Center for Company Law. He holds a visiting appointment at Leiden University Faculty of Law.Piet Moerland is Professor of Corporate Governance at Tilburg University where he teaches courses on mergers and acquisitions and corporate governance.M.J.G.C. (Theo) Raaijmakers is Professor of Corporate Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law.Luc Renneboog is Associate Professor at the Department of Finance of Tilburg University and research fellow at the Center for Economic Research (Tilburg). Klappentext This volume provides an up-to-the-minute survey of the field of corporate governance, focusing particularly on issues of convergence and diversity. A number of topics are discussed including bankruptcy procedures, initial public offerings, the role of large stakes, comparative corporate governance, and institutional investors. Zusammenfassung This book seeks to examine the relationship between corporate law rules and economic performance. Contributors examine the design of the two main systems of corporate governance to ascertain which bundle of rules is likely to support the emergence of a strong system of governance. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1: J. McCahery and L. Renneboog: Introduction I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law? 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control? 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe? III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations? 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for Product and Capital Market Competition 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American Bankruptcy Procedures 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution Threats in Different Financial Systems 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds VII. Executive Compensatio...
