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Zusatztext 'This book constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of the shifts in British strategic thinking during a decade when the foundations of Britain's nuclear force were laid.'Richard J. Aldrich! History Klappentext Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States. Zusammenfassung Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What military plans were there for using it? This neglected dimension of British nuclear policy is assessed in detail for the first time, using confidential records - including those of the Chiefs of Staff - which have become available for the entire post-war decade.The emergence and evolution of British strategic ideas about nuclear deterrence and targeting are documented and analysed by Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, who also argue that British thinking was distinctive and made a much more substantial impact on nuclear strategy than American accounts would suggest. They reveal that, from a perspective unique to British circumstances and traditions, British officials made a significant contribution to early thinking about nuclear weapons.This study covers the early shift from a 'countervalue' to a damage limitation targeting posture, the assessment of the Soviet threat, the impact of the Korean War, the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, the decision to manufacture a hydrogen weapon in 1954, and the inter-service rivalries in the mid-1950s about the nature and size of the British strategic force. As well as providing a survey of British thinking, it is unusual in its focus on strategic comparisons between Britain and the United States. Inhaltsverzeichnis Acknowledgements; Introduction; Britain's strategic legacy; Atomic decisions and threat assessment; British origins of nuclear deterrence 1945-6; The doctrine of damage limitation 1946-9; Operational planning and Anglo-American strategic co-ordination 1945-50; Korea and Anglo-American nuclear strategy 1950-2; The global strategy paper and the United States `New Look'; Mass destruction, nuclear war-fighting and delivery systems 1953-5; The hydrogen bomb and deterrence in concert 1954-5; Conclusion...
