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Zusatztext `This book is chock full of ideas and arguments. There is a little something here for anyone interested in action, free action, responsibility, decision makin, and the practice of blaming ... Not only is the book wide-ranging, it is refreshingly open-minded about issues that tend to inspire rather dogmatic partisanship ... it stimulated me to reconsider my own views on many of the issues it discusses ... I believe Klein's proposal reflects an insight well worth underscoring.'The Philosophical Review Klappentext This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity. Zusammenfassung This book casts new light on the classic dispute between `compatibilists' and `incompatibilists' about determinism and moral responsibility. Martha Klein argues that the traditional account of the dispute, turning as it does on the notion of the agent's `ability to have acted otherwise', misrepresents the real disagreement, which arises from the compatibilists' conviction that it is sufficient for blameworthiness that an agent's wrongdoing was the result of a morally reprehensible frame of mind, and the incompatibilists' insistence that wrongdoers cannot be morally responsible for their actions if they are not responsible for their motivating desires and beliefs. The incompatibilist position seems compelling when, for instance, we consider wrongdoers whose desires and attitudes can be traced to early emotional deprivation. The author argues that our response to these and other `problem cases' commits us to an incompatibilist condition for blameworthiness which is actually unfulfillable. In her view, however, some reflections on emotional deprivation should also encourage acceptance of a compatibilist condition which will satisfy our desire to be just more fully than the usual proposals emanating from either side of the debate. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction; The compatabilist and the could-have-acted-otherwise condition; Frankfurt, van Inwagen and the could-have-acted-otherwise condition; The compatabilist, the could-have-acted-otherwise condition and the U-condition; Are we committed to a U-condition for blameworthiness?; Can the U-condition for blameworthiness be fulfilled?; What should we do about our commitment to the U-condition?; A compatabilist principle for just blaming; Appendix; Index; Bibliography...
