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Zusatztext I definitely recommend this book to all scholars of corporate governance and anybody else interested in the origins of corporate governance systems ... a joy to read ... Roe's book is a welcome and stimulating addition to the field. Informationen zum Autor Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994). Klappentext The political and social predicates that make the large firm possible and that shape its form are not always taken into account! despite the fact that variation in the political and social environment can deeply affect which firms! which ownership structures! and which governance arrangements survive and prosper. Focussing on the US! the larger nations in continental Europe! and Japan! Mark Roe uses statistical and qualitative analyses to explore the relationship between politics! history! and business organization. Zusammenfassung Focusing on the US, the larger nations in continental Europe, and Japan, Mark Roe uses statistical and qualitative analyses to explore the relationship between politics, history, and business organization. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Part I: Political Conflict and the Corporation 1: Peace as Predicate 2: The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures 3: A General Theory Part II: Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance 4: Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes 5: Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers Part III: Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data 6: Data and Confirmation Part IV: Nation by Nation 7: France 8: Germany 9: Italy 10: Japan 11: Sweden 12: United Kingdom 13: United States 14: Extending the Sample? Part V: The Direction of Causality 15: Alternative Formulations of the Thesis 16: Backlash 17: Contract as Metaphor 18: Rents 19: Rents and Politics 20: Rents and Ownership Concentration 21: Political Change in Continental Europe 22: Alternative Formulations: Data Part VI: The Quality of Corporate Law Argument and its Limits 23: Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory 24: Its Limits: Theory 25: Its Limits: Data 26: The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits Part VII: Unifying the Political Theories 27: Populism and Socialism in Corporate Governance Conclusion ...
