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Zusatztext I definitely recommend this book to all scholars of corporate governance and anybody else interested in the origins of corporate governance systems ... a joy to read ... Roe's book is a welcome and stimulating addition to the field. Informationen zum Autor Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994). Klappentext Before a nation can produce, it must achieve social peace. That social peace has been reached in different nations by differing means, some of which have then been embedded in business firms, in corporate ownership patterns, and in corporate governance structures. The large publicly held, diffusely owned firm dominates business in the United States despite its infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. But in other economically advanced nations, ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the delicate threads that tie managers to shareholders in the public firm fray easily in common political environments, such as those in the continental European social democracies. Social democracies press managers to stabilize employment, to forego some profit-maximizing risks with the firm, and to use up capital in place rather than to downsize when markets no longer are aligned with the firm's production capabilities. Since managers must have discretion in the public firm, how they use that discretion is crucial to stockholders, and social democratic pressures induce managers to stray farther than otherwise from their shareholders' profit-maximizing goals. Moreover, the means that align managers with diffuse stockholders in the United States-incentive compensation, hostile takeovers, and strong shareholder-wealth maximization norms-are weaker and sometimes denigrated in continental social democracies. Hence, public firms there have higher managerial agency costs, and large-block shareholding has persisted as shareholders' best remaining way to control those costs. Social democracies may enhance total social welfare, but if they do, they do so with fewer public firms than less socially responsive nations. The author therefore uncovers not only a political explanation for ownership concentration in Europe, but also a crucial political prerequisite to the rise of the public firm in the United States, namely the weakness of social democratic pressures on the American business firm. Zusammenfassung Focusing on the US, the larger nations in continental Europe, and Japan, Mark Roe uses statistical and qualitative analyses to explore the relationship between politics, history, and business organization. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction Part I: Political Conflict and the Corporation 1: Peace as Predicate 2: The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures 3: A General Theory Part II: Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance 4: Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes 5: Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers Part III: Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data 6: Data and Confirmation Part IV: Nation by Nation 7: France 8: Germany 9: Italy 10: Japan 11: Sweden 12: United Kingdom 13: United States 14: Extending the Sample? Part V: The Direction of Causality 15: Alternative Formulations of the Thesis 16: Backlash 17: Contract as Metaphor 18: Rents 19: Rents and Politics 20: Rents and Ow...
