Fr. 167.00

Repeated Games and Reputations - Long-Run Relationships

English · Hardback

Shipping usually within 1 to 3 weeks (not available at short notice)

Description

Read more

Zusatztext Repeated Games is comprehensive! self-contained! and extremely clear! with proofs that not infrequently improve on the originals. The book is an ideal text for part or all of a second graduate class in game theory! and will be a valuable aid for any student of the field. Informationen zum Autor George J. Mailath (Ph. D., Princeton University) is the Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. Larry Samuelson (Ph. D., University of Illinois) is the Antoine Augustin Cournot Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin. Klappentext This book provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and coninuing to research frontier. Detailed theoretical arguments are complemented by copious exmaples and economic applications of the theory. Zusammenfassung Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research....

Product details

Authors Mailath, George J. Mailath, George J. (Professor of Economics Mailath, George J. Samuelson Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Larry (Professor of Economics Samuelson
Publisher Oxford University Press
 
Languages English
Product format Hardback
Released 12.10.2006
 
EAN 9780195300796
ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6
No. of pages 672
Subject Social sciences, law, business > Business > Economics

Customer reviews

No reviews have been written for this item yet. Write the first review and be helpful to other users when they decide on a purchase.

Write a review

Thumbs up or thumbs down? Write your own review.

For messages to CeDe.ch please use the contact form.

The input fields marked * are obligatory

By submitting this form you agree to our data privacy statement.