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Informationen zum Autor Pablo T. Spiller (Ph.D. in Economics, University of Chicago, 1980) is the Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professor of Business & Technology at the University of California, Berkeley, and Research Associate, NBER. He has held academic positions at the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University and the University of Illinois, at Urbana-Champaign. He has published several books and more than ninety articles in the general area of political economy and industrial organization. He is the co-editor of the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and Associate Editor of the Journal of Applied Economics, The Regulation Magazine and of The Utilities Project. He has been a Special Advisor to the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics, and was also an elected Member of the Board of Directors of the American Law & Economics Association. Klappentext This book develops a general model of public policymaking, focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. By using this model the authors are able to derive a series of empirical propositions about the conditions under which policies are likely to be volatile, rigid, or high quality. In addition, the authors combine the tools of game theory with Williamson's transaction cost theory, North's institutional arguments, and contract theory, to provide a general theory of public policymaking in a comparative political economy setting. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical analyses on newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes. Drawing on this research the book explores the reasons for Argentina's seeming inability to design and implement high quality public policies over a sustained period of time. Zusammenfassung This book develops a general model of public policymaking! focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina! using statistical newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions! rules! incentives and outcomes. Inhaltsverzeichnis Part I. An Intertemporal Approach to Policymaking: 1. Sketch of the framework and implications; 2. A theory of intertemporal political cooperation; Part II. The Workings of Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Policies in Argentina: 3. Congress, political careers, and the provincial connection; 4. Federalism, Argentine style; 5. The Supreme Court; 6. The bureaucracy; 7. The nature of public policies in Argentina....
