Fr. 185.00

Models, Truth, and Realism

English · Hardback

Shipping usually within 3 to 5 weeks

Description

Read more

Klappentext Barry Taylor's book mounts a major new argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. He concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth which preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. In presenting his case Taylor engages with many key works of contemporary metaphysics, semantics, and philosophical logic, so his book will be of interest to a broad spectrum of scholars and students. Zusammenfassung Mounts a major argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. This book concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth, which preserves the theses of traditional realism. Inhaltsverzeichnis Overview I. The explication of realism 1: Realism and objective truth 2: Realism explicated II. Model theory and correspondence 3: Putnam's model-theoretic arguments 4: Changing the rules 5: The status of natural properties III. Realism without correspondence? 6: Taking the hierarchy seriously 7: Commonsense Realism explained 8: Tarskian truth and the views of John McDowell Coda: Brandom, compositionality, and singular terms

Customer reviews

No reviews have been written for this item yet. Write the first review and be helpful to other users when they decide on a purchase.

Write a review

Thumbs up or thumbs down? Write your own review.

For messages to CeDe.ch please use the contact form.

The input fields marked * are obligatory

By submitting this form you agree to our data privacy statement.