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Zusatztext The arguments are delivered in a clear and systematic way. The book presents a good combination of general, comparative perspectives and a more in-depth presentation of national cases ... keeps its distance from statistical macroeconomic approaches: it presents a lot of quantitative material, but also puts it in a social and political context. Informationen zum Autor Gøsta Esping-Andersen ( Professor University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona and University of Trento, Italia)Marino Regini (Professor of Sociology, University of Milano, and Director of IRES Lombardia) Klappentext Europe's mass unemployment and the call for extensive labor market de-regulation have! perhaps more than any other contemporary issue! impassioned political debate and academic research. With contributions from economists! political scientists and sociologists! Why Deregulate Labour Markets? takes a hard look at the empirical connections between unemployment and regulation in Europe today! utilizing both in-depth nation analyses and broader-based international comparisons. Zusammenfassung With contributions from economists, political scientists and sociologists, 'Why Deregulate Labour Markets?' takes a hard look at the empirical connections between unemployment and regulation in Europe today, utilizing both in-depth nation analyses and broader-based international comparisons. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction PART I. LABOUR MARKET REFORM IN EUROPE The dilemmas of labour market regulation The dynamics of labour market reform in European countries Who is harmed by Labour Market Regulations? Quantitative Evidence Regulation and context. Reconsidering the correlates of unemployment PART II. NATIONAL VARIATIONS River Crossing or Cold Bath? Deregulation and Employment in Britain Going different ways: labour market policy in Denmark and Sweden The Dutch miracle? Germany: A regulated flexibility France: The deregulation that never existed Italy: the long times of consensual re-regulation The Spanish experiment: pros and cons of the flexibility at the margin Conclusions ...
