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Informationen zum Autor Vernon L. Smith was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 2002 for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms. He holds joint appointments with the Argyros School of Business and Economics and the School of Law at Chapman University, California, where he also is part of the team that will create and run the Economic Science Institute there. Cambridge University Press published his Papers in Experimental Economics in 1991 and a second collection, Bargaining and Market Behavior, in 2000. Klappentext The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory! under information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory. n personal! social! and economic exchange! as studied in two-person games! cooperation exceeds the prediction of traditional game theory. This book relates these two findings to field studies and applications and integrates them with the main themes of the Scottish Enlightenment and with the thoughts of F. A. Hayek: through emergent socioeconomic institutions and cultural norms! people achieve ends that are unintended and poorly understood. In cultural changes the role of constructivism! or reason! is to provide variation! and the role of ecological processes is to select the norms and institutions that serve the fitness needs of societies. Zusammenfassung This book constitutes an empirical behavioral challenge to traditional economic and game theory. Using constructivist and ecological approaches! Vernon L. Smith! a 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economic Science! provides a new perspective based on experimental science that considers the work of F. A. Hayek and the classical liberal tradition. Inhaltsverzeichnis Part I. Rationality, Markets, and Institutions: 1. Rediscovering the Scottish philosophers; 2. On two forms of rationality; Part II. Impersonal Exchange: The Extended Order of the Market: 3. Relating the two concepts of a rational order; 4. Market institutions and performance; 5. Asymmetric information and equilibrium without process; 6. Spectrum auctions and combinatorial designs: theory and experiment; 7. Psychology and markets; 8. What is rationality?; Part III. Personal Social Exchange: 9. Emergent order without the law; 10. The effects of context on behavior; Appendix: behavioral deviation from prediction: error, confusion, or evidence of brain function?; 11. Investment trust games: effects of gains from exchange in dictator giving; 12. Reciprocity in trust games; Part IV. Order and Rationality in Method and Mind: 13. Rationality in science; 14. Neuroeconomics: the internal order of the mind; 15. A summary....
