Anarchy Unbound - Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance.

List of contents

1. Anarchy unbound; Part I. Self-Governance and the Problem of Social Diversity: 2. Social distance and self-enforcing exchange; 3. The laws of lawlessness; Part II. Self-Governance and the Problem of Violence: 4. Trading with bandits; 5. Efficient plunder; Part III. Social-Governance and the Problem of 'Bad Apples': 6. Pirates' private order; 7. Criminal constitutions; Part IV. Self-Governance as Superior to the State: 8. Efficient anarchy; 9. Better off stateless; 10. An argument for anarchy in LDCs; 11. A future for thinking about self-governance.

About the author

Peter T. Leeson is a Professor of Economics and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University, Virginia. He is also the North American editor of Public Choice. Previously, he was a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, the F. A. Hayek Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Visiting Fellow in Political Economy at Harvard University, Massachusetts. Professor Leeson is the author of The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (2009) and a recipient of the Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Order's Hayek Prize, which he received for his research on self-governance.

Product details

• Authors: Peter T. Leeson
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 30.06.2014
• EAN: 9781107025806
• ISBN: 978-1-107-02580-6
• No. of pages: 270
• Series: Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society; Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
• Subjects: Social sciences, law, business > Political science > Political science and political education; Sociology, POLITICAL SCIENCE / General, Economics, macroeconomics, Political Economy, Economic theory and philosophy