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Tactically the most absurd and strategically the most senseless campaign of the whole war.' Major-General J F C Fuller's verdict on the Italian Campaign, 1948The invasion of Sicily on 10 June 1943 and the landings on the Italian mainland in September that year gave the Allies their first toehold in Europe since 1941. But it was achieved at a cost. Following success in Sicily the forces were put under considerable pressure to take advantage of the changed situation and they landed at Salerno without a clear strategic aim and were met with fierce German counterattack. The subsequent march north was complicated by Italy's unique terrain (mountains and rivers), its climatic extremes (very hot summers; freezing winters) and German resistance, and was agonisingly slow. Ian Gooderson's considered analysis of the entire campaign places the convoluted mixture of air, land and naval actions into the context of the overall war, covering the major battles of Salerno and Monte Cassino, as well as the complex alliances and mixed commands of the Allied forces. More importantly, he shows how the commanders on the battlefield dealt with the military issues as they arose. In doing so, he has produced one of the finest explanations of a combined forces twentieth-century battle zone ever published and this book is surely the standard work against which others will be judged.
