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Klappentext This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy. Zusammenfassung First published in 2000! this is a wide-ranging contribution to the literature on industrial economics by leading scholars from Europe and North America! combining theory and applied case studies! on the sometimes surprising effects of competition or anti-trust policy on industry structure. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction; 1. Competition policy and game theory: reflection based on the cement industry case Claude d'Aspremont, David Encaoua and Jean-Pierre Ponssard; 2. Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in the EC competition policy Damien J. Neven; 3. A guided tour of the folk theorem James W. Friedman; 4. Predatory pricing and anti-dumping P. K. M. Tharakan; 5. Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude? George Norman and Jacques-François Thisse; 6. Tougher price competition or lower concentration: a trade-off for antitrust authorities? Claude d'Aspremont and Massimo Motta; 7. The strategic effects of supply guarantees: the raincheck game Jonathan H. Hamilton; 8. Product market competition policy and technological performance Stephen Martin; 9. On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets Gianni de Fraja; 10. Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition: an introduction to repeated commitment models Jean-Pierre Ponssard; 11. Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition André de Palma and Robert J. Gary-Bobo; 12. How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labor and product markets Xavier Wauthy and Yves Zenou.
