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For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has done pioneering work which brings phenomenology and existentialism to bear on the philosophical and scientific study of the mind. This is a selection of his most influential essays, developing his critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science.
List of contents
- Introduction: Hubert Dreyfus and the Phenomenology of Human Intelligence
- Section One: The phenomenology of skills
- 1: From Socrates to Expert Systems: The Limits of Calculative Rationality (with Stuart E. Dreyfus) (1985)
- Section Two: Intentionality and Mind
- 2: The Perceptual Noema: Gurwitsch's Crucial Contribution (1972)
- 3: Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality (1993)
- 4: Todes's Account of Nonconceptual Perceptual Knowledge and Its Relation to Thought (2001)
- 5: Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise (2005)
- Section Three: Phenomenology and the Human Sciences
- 6: Holism and Hermeneutics (1980)
- 7: The Primacy of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis (2001)
- 8: From Depth Psychology to Breadth Psychology: A Phenomenological Approach to Psychopathology (with Jerome Wakefield) (1988)
- 9: What is Moral Maturity? Towards A Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise (with Stuart E. Dreyfus) (1992)
- Section Four: Embodied Coping and Artificial Intelligence
- 10: Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint (with Stuart E. Dreyfus) (1988)
- 11: Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science (2004)
- 12: Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian (2007)
- Bibliography
- Index
About the author
Hubert L. Dreyfus is Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate School at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests bridge the Analytic and Continental traditions in twentieth-century philosophy focusing on non-conceptual intentional content in skilled action and in perception. He is author of What Computers (Still) Can't Do (MIT, 1992) and Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (MIT, 1991).
Mark A. Wrathall is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. He is the author of Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language and History (CUP, 2010) and the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time (CUP, 2013).
Summary
For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has done pioneering work which brings phenomenology and existentialism to bear on the philosophical and scientific study of the mind. This is a selection of his most influential essays, developing his critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science.
Additional text
Wrathall has done an admirable job of assembling papers that, taken together, offer a remarkably cohesive picture of Dreyfus's position as it has developed over the years it makes an important contribution, and scholars interested in gaining a better understanding of Dreyfus's position on these topics will gain something by reading this volume.
