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Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself¿not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
List of contents
- Preface
- 1: The Problem
- 2: 'Up to Us-ness', Agency and Determinism
- 3: Action as Settling: Some Objections
- 4: Animal Agency
- 5: The Epistemological Argument
- 6: Indeterminism and Intelligibility
- 7: Responding to the Challenge from Chance: Some Objections
- 8: Agency, Substance Causation, and Top-Down Causation
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
About the author
Helen Steward studied philosophy, politics, and economics at the University of Oxford. She was a Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, for many years before moving to the University of Leeds, where she is currently a Senior Lecturer.
Summary
Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
Additional text
Steward introduces a novel position in the freewill debate ... Anyone interested in mind and agency must read this book.
