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The politics of cutting public spending or raising taxes (or both) has dominated politics in many democracies in recent years. A new era of conflict has developed, with old political alignments being tested and new battles emerging over whose expectations are to be disappointed and who should be blamed for fiscal squeeze.
Do parties who cut spending always go down to defeat in elections? Are there 'best practice' cases that every government should follow when it has to cut spending or raise taxes to balance its public finances? Such issues have mainly been analysed from an economic or financial perspective and in the context of recent cases. By contrast, this book focuses on the politics of fiscal squeeze and takes a longer view.
It combines quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine cases ranging from the fiscal squeeze in the United States in the 1830s/40s (when half of the states then in the Union defaulted) to the squeeze following the 2001 Argentinian default. It assesses who were the winners and losers, who got the blame and what were the longer-term effects on politics and government. It argues that 'how to do it' approaches to fiscal squeeze in democracies, based on apparently successful cases, often fail to take into account profound differences in circumstances.
List of contents
- PART ONE: Introduction
- 1: Christopher Hood and David Heald: The Politics of Fiscal Squeeze
- 2: Rozana Himaz and Christopher Hood: Comparing Fiscal Squeezes Across Nine Country Cases
- PART TWO: Case Studies
- 3: Alasdair Roberts: Managing Fiscal Squeeze After the United States' Panic of 1837
- 4: Christopher Hood and Rozana Himaz: The UK Geddes Axe of the 1920s in Perspective
- 5: Chris Eichbaum and Bob Gregory: Carpe Diem! New Zealand's Fiscal Squeeze, 1990-1993: Economic Problems, Welfare Reform and Political Consequences
- 6: Walter Kickert: Fiscal Squeeze in Dutch Municipalities in the 1980s: Cutback Measures and Public Management Reforms
- 7: Niamh Hardiman: Repeating History: Fiscal Squeeze in Two Recessions in Ireland
- 8: Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich: Fiscal Consolidation in Germany: Drifting Away from the Politics of the Switching Yard?
- 9: Anders Lindbom: Fiscal Squeeze in Sweden 1990-1997: The Causes, the Measures, and Their Short- and Long-run Effects
- 10: Donald Savoie: A Perfect Storm in Reverse: The 1994-97 Program Review in Canada
- 11: Sebastian Dellepiane: Budget Politics in Really Hard Times: Fiscal Squeeze During and After Argentina's Great Depression
- PART THREE: Conclusion
- 12: David Heald, Rozana Himaz and Christopher Hood: Politics In and After Fiscal Squeeze
About the author
Christopher Hood,
Gladstone Professor of Government, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford David Heald,
Professor of Accountancy, University of Aberdeen Business School Rozanna Himaz,
Lecturer in Economics, Queen's College Oxford and Post Doctoral Researcher, Department of Politics, Oxford
Summary
The politics of cutting public spending or raising taxes (or both) has dominated politics in many democracies in recent years. A new era of conflict has developed, with old political alignments being tested and new battles emerging over whose expectations are to be disappointed and who should be blamed for fiscal squeeze.
Do parties who cut spending always go down to defeat in elections? Are there 'best practice' cases that every government should follow when it has to cut spending or raise taxes to balance its public finances? Such issues have mainly been analysed from an economic or financial perspective and in the context of recent cases. By contrast, this book focuses on the politics of fiscal squeeze and takes a longer view.
It combines quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine cases ranging from the fiscal squeeze in the United States in the 1830s/40s (when half of the states then in the Union defaulted) to the squeeze following the 2001 Argentinian default. It assesses who were the winners and losers, who got the blame and what were the longer-term effects on politics and government. It argues that 'how to do it' approaches to fiscal squeeze in democracies, based on apparently successful cases, often fail to take into account profound differences in circumstances.
