Body, Mind and Self in Hume's Critical Realism

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

Product details

• Authors: Fred Wilson
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 14.02.2008
• EAN: 9783110326680
• ISBN: 978-3-11-032668-0
• No. of pages: 512
• Dimensions: 155 mm x 217 mm x 35 mm
• Weight: 882 g
• Series: Philosophische Analyse /Philosophical Analysis; Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis; ISSN
• Subjects: Humanities, art, music > Philosophy > German idealism, 19th century; Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: antiquity to present day