Two-Sided Matching - A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

List of contents

Foreword Robert Auman; Acknowledgment; 1. Introduction; Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings; 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings; 4. Strategic questions; Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns; 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences; Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers; 8. The assignment game; 9. The generalization of the assignment model; Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions; Bibliography; Indexes.

Summary

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This text provides a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching.

Product details

• Authors: Econometric Society, Alvin E. Roth, Alvin E. Sotomayor Roth, Marilda A. Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor
• Assisted by: Andrew Chesher (Editor)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 26.06.1992
• EAN: 9780521437882
• ISBN: 978-0-521-43788-2
• No. of pages: 280
• Series: Econometric Society Monographs; Econometric Society Monographs
• Subjects: Guides > Law, job, finance; Social sciences, law, business > Business > Miscellaneous