Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining With a Variable Number of Agents

Klappentext This book extrapolates on the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary. Zusammenfassung This book extrapolates on the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary. The authors formulate axioms to specify how solutions should respond to such changes and provide new characterizations of all the major solutions as well as the generalizations of these solutions. Inhaltsverzeichnis Acknowledgments; 1. Preliminaries; 2. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a fixed number of agents; 3. Population monotonicity and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; 4. Population monotonicity and the egalitarian solution; 5. Truncated egalitarian and monotone path solutions; 6. Guarantees and opportunities; 7. Stability and the Nash solution; 8. Stability without pareto-optimality; 9. Stability and the leximin solution; 10. Population monotonicity, weak stability and the egalitarian solution; 11. Stability and collectively rational solutions; 12. Invariance under replication and juxtaposition; Bibliography; Index.

Product details

• Authors: Baron William Thomson Lensberg Kelvin, Terje Lensberg, William Thomson, William Lensberg Thomson
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 24.02.1989
• EAN: 9780521343831
• ISBN: 978-0-521-34383-1
• No. of pages: 222
• Subjects: Guides > Law, job, finance; Social sciences, law, business > Business > Management